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JUSTICE JACKSON’S LAMENT: HISTORICAL
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
AVAILABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
RICHARD A. DANNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969, the newly-established Law Commissions of Great Britain and Scotland issued a joint report on The Interpretation of Stat1
utes , which looked at interpretive practices of courts in the United
States, other common-law jurisdictions and several civil-law systems
as part of a review of the rules of interpretation applied by English
and Scottish courts.2 In part, the report focused on whether evidence
from “the parliamentary history of an act” (legislative history in the
U.S.) should be admissible in resolving statutory interpretation questions. In discussing the question, the joint report considered three criteria: relevance, reliability, and availability.3
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1. THE LAW COMMISSION AND THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, THE
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (1969) (Law Com. No. 21; Scot. Law Com. No. 11) [hereinafter
Joint Commissions Report]. The Law Commissions were established by the Law Commissions
Act 1965, sec. 1 & 2, with the idea of inserting greater political independence into the theory
and practice of law reform. See Andrew Martin, The Machinery of Law Reform, in MORE LAW
REFORM NOW: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON LAW REFORM 229, 231 (Peter Archer & Andrew Martin ed. 1983). See also R. T. OERTON, A LAMENT FOR THE LAW COMMISSION (1987).
2. The rules of statutory interpretation were controversial in England before and after the
issuance of the 1969 joint report, which has been called the “only [law commission] report to
have been rejected by Parliament.” Alec Samuels, The Interpretation of Statutes, 1980 STATUTE
L. REV. 86, 87. See also Alec Samuels, The Interpretation of Statutes: No Change, THE LAW
SOCIETY’S GAZETTE, Oct. 7, 1982, at 1252, 52 (discussing parliament’s failure to enact a 1981
statutory interpretation bill).
3. Joint Commissions Report, supra note 1, at 31-37. For a similar list, with one addition
(whether the material is relied on by the legislature), see Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpreta-
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After quickly concluding that legislative material would be relevant to most questions of statutory interpretation, the joint report
turned to matters of reliability and availability. The discussion of reliability looked at contemporary uses of the materials in the United
States and other systems, and in many ways anticipated questions
about the uses of legislative history that would be raised in the 1990s
“new textualism” debates in the United States. The report’s discussion of availability looked back for insight largely to the comments of
Justice Robert H. Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, who
at mid-century had voiced his concern that the materials of legislative
history were not readily available to all lawyers arguing cases before
the Court.4 The Joint Commissions Report acknowledged Justice
Jackson’s concerns about judicial reliance on materials that were fully
available only to “the lawyers of the capital or the most prosperous
offices in the large cities,”5 but also pointed out that problems of
availability were not much emphasized by other American writers on
6
the uses of legislative history. In fact, the 1958 “tentative edition” of
Hart and Sacks’ materials on “The Legal Process” had challenged one
7
of Jackson’s primary examples by reprinting several pages of correspondence between the attorneys in United States v. Public Utilities
Commission of California and the Harvard Law Library, and detailing the general availability of the materials in U.S. government depository libraries in each state.8 In the end, the Law Commissions
tion: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1983). For a more detailed discussion, see REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 142-62 (1975).
4. See Robert J. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court
Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535 (1948) (remarks before the American Law Institute, May 20, 1948), reprinted with revisions as Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121 (1949). See also
United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n. of Calif., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J. concurring); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J. concurring).
5. Jackson, supra note 4, 34 A.B.A.J. at 538; 8 F.R.D. at 125.
6. Joint Commissions Report, supra note 1, at 35, n. 149. See also Note, A Re-Evaluation
of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 125, 132 (1952)
(“There seems to be little indication that [Justice Jackson]’s position has been accepted by the
other members of the Supreme Court.”).
7. In Public Utilities Commission of California, Jackson had argued that neither the
Commission nor the California Supreme Court had access to documents relied upon by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its resolution of the case. The necessary material apparently was unavailable
in San Francisco, and according to the record, could not be obtained through interlibrary loan
(although requests were made of the Library of Congress and the Harvard Law School library).
345 U.S. 295, 319-320.
8. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1248-1252 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
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concluded that parliamentary history should not be admissible for interpretation, citing the difficulties both of isolating which information
would assist the courts and of providing the information “in a reasonably convenient and accessible form.”9
In the United States, concerns about the availability of legislative
history materials to lawyers, judges, and the public remained a littlediscussed topic in statutory interpretation opinions and the legal lit10
erature. By 1983, in an analysis of the Supreme Court’s increasing
reliance on legislative materials, Court of Appeals Judge Patricia
Wald was little enough concerned with problems of availability to
suggest that “Technology has made an anachronism of Justice Jack11
son’s lament. . . .”
The general lack of interest in questions of availability continued
even as the literature on statutory interpretation and the uses of leg12
islative history exploded in the 1990s. Many recent commentators
on the federal courts’ reliance on legislative history have questioned
the reliability of Congressional materials, but most have assumed that
the documents in question are readily available and that the information they contain is easily accessible to those who use them.13 Writers
who have looked at the history of U.S. courts’ uses of legislative
documents in statutory interpretation have noted the courts’ increasing reliance on legislative history in the late nineteenth century.
However, they have typically failed to consider what effects improvements in the systems for publishing and distributing Congressional documents in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
might have had on judges’ increased reliance on legislative history as
the twentieth century progressed.

Frickey eds., 1994). For another contemporary comment, see Elizabeth Finley, Crystal Gazing:
The Problem of Legislative History, 45 A.B.A.J. 1281, 1283 (1959) (suggesting that Jackson’s
concern may have been over the unavailability of a “compiled” legislative history for the act in
question, rather than the individual documents from which the information could have been
drawn).
9. Joint Commissions Report, supra note 1, at 36.
10. But see, e.g., DICKERSON (1975), supra note 3, at 147-154.
11. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 200 (1983)
12. For the legislative history literature, see the materials cited infra note 30.
13. For contrary examples, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 868-869 (1992); W. David Slawson, Legislative History
and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383,
408-09 (1992); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 371, 377-378. For expressions of concern over problems of “practical availability,” see generally DICKERSON (1975), supra note 3, at 147-154.
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Bob Berring has suggested that the forms in which legal information is published and distributed can be influential in the development
14
of legal knowledge. This article tests the possibilities of that idea by
examining the role of greater availability of legislative history information on the increased use of legislative history in the early twentieth century. The article explores the availability question in light of
developments in the history of the printing and distribution of Congressional documents, while looking specifically at the impacts of late
nineteenth century changes in the systems for publication and distribution of federal documents. Part II of the article introduces the
primary approaches to statutory interpretation in United States
courts, provides comparisons with other common law jurisdictions,
and describes the publication history of Congressional committee reports and records of debates on the floor of Congress. Part III discusses uses of Congressional materials in nineteenth century courts,
and how legislative history was viewed in contemporary treatises.
Part IV explores possible explanations for the increased uses of legislative history by federal courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Part V examines the impacts of the Printing Act of
1895 and other changes in the distribution system for government
publications on the greater availability of legislative history in the
early twentieth century. Part VI discusses the continued applicability
of concerns about availability in the twentieth-first century information environment, twenty years after Justice Jackson’s “lament” was
deemed anachronistic in light of technological advances.
II. APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION AND
THE USES OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. United States
The primary factor differentiating the usual approaches to the interpretation of statutes in the United States is captured in a question
asked by Justice Jackson in 1948: “[S]hould a statute mean to a Court
what was in the minds but not put into the words of men behind it, or
should it mean what its language reasonably conveys to those who are
14. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 15, 15 (1987) (“From the late nineteenth century, the development of the
American legal system can be seen as a history of the development of forms of legal publication.
This history poses the question of whether the forms of publication have been mere vehicles for
the transmission of legal knowledge, or important influences in the development of that knowledge.”).
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expected to obey it?”15 Some approaches emphasize the primary, if
not the exclusive, role of the meaning of the text of the statute to
readers; the others begin with the text, but focus either on the law
makers’ intentions regarding the specific language at issue or on the
general purpose of the statute. Intentionalist and purposive interpreters are more likely than text-based interpreters to examine and
rely on sources outside the enacted text. Most modern writers have
acknowledged this basic taxonomy of approaches while occasionally
using other terminology to describe and elaborate the boundaries
among them.16
Prior to the twentieth century, U.S. courts generally limited their
analyses to the statutory text, even if their stated goal was to identify
the intent of the legislature. In the nineteenth century, what came to
be known as the “plain meaning rule” was increasingly invoked by
federal and state courts, at times to deny that there was any need to
17
interpret statutory language deemed to be plain and unambiguous.
In the early twentieth century, judges began to look more frequently
at sources outside the statutory text as aids to interpretation, and by
1940 the Supreme Court had repudiated use of the plain meaning rule

15. Jackson, supra note 4, 34 A.B.A.J. at 538, 8 F.R.D. at 124. See also J. A. Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 286, 289-290 (1936)
(“There have always been two schools of thought as to the interpretation of the meaning of
words. One has held that, in the search, it is not profitable or necessary to go beyond the words
themselves. The other view has insisted that words by themselves do not have definite and exact meanings, and that their true meaning can be expounded only by reference to the intention
of him who used them. In relation to legislation, this latter view has always led to a search for
the ‘intention of the legislature.’”).
16. Surveys of theories and approaches are found throughout the literature of statutory
interpretation. See, e.g.: WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
9-47 (1994); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20,
22-32 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691 (1987); Peter C. Schanck, The Only
Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative
Histories, 38 KAN. L. REV. 815 (1990), published in slightly different form as Peter C. Schanck,
The Only Game in Town: Contemporary Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories, 82 LAW LIBR. J. 419 (1990).
17. Blatt notes that plain meaning approaches developed gradually during the nineteenth
century in the United States, being mentioned periodically early on, and gaining stature after
the 1835 publication of an American edition of Sir Fortunatus Dwarris’s A General Treatise on
Statutes, first published in England in 1830. By the 1850s, courts “felt compelled to commence
their analysis by mentioning the plain meaning rule.” William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory
Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 812 (1985). For an
extensive treatment of the interpretive practices of the early nineteenth-century federal courts,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., All about Work: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1058-1082 (2001).

6DANNER

156

09/10/03 4:13 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 13:151

as a “filtering device” for statutory interpretation,18 stating that “there
certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids [the use of legislative
history], however clear the words may appear to be on ‘superficial examination.’”19 In the 1980s, however, after decades in which U.S.
courts regularly looked beyond the text to determine intent or purpose, text-centered approaches regained prominence due in large part
to the influence of Justice Antonin Scalia.20
Intentionalist interpreters, like advocates of text-based approaches, usually consider the meaning of legislation to have been de21
termined at the time of enactment. Rather than emphasizing the
meaning of the text to the receiver of the statutory message, however,
intentionalism emphasizes the intention of its sender. In asking what
the legislature intended by the words that it enacted into law, the intentionalist opens the questions of where beyond the text one can legitimately search for evidence of meaning and intent22 and whether
statements of possible intent in sources extrinsic to the text should be
allowed to raise doubts about the meaning of apparently clear text.
18. Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Intertemporal Law of Statutory Construction and Constitutional Interpretation, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 319, 322 (1995).
19. United States v. Amer. Trucking Assoc., 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940). For discussions of
judges’ continuing uses of the plain meaning rule, see Harry Wilmer Jones, The Plain Meaning
Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2 (1939). Arthur W.
Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the
“Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 S.CT. L. REV. 231; David A.
Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565 (1997); Eric S. Lasky, Note, Perplexing Problems with Plain Meaning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 891 (1999).
20. On the differences between plain meaning and “modern textualist” approaches, see
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 109-115
(2001). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
21. See ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 16, at 9
(“The ‘original intent’ and ‘plain meaning’ rhetoric in American statutory interpretation scholarship and decisions treats statutes as static texts and assumes that the meaning of a statute is
fixed from the date of enactment.”) For an approach less reliant on the idea that statutes are
“static texts,” see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987).
22. “On the traditional ‘intentionalist’ account, language [of the text] is the best evidence
of the legislative intent underlying a statute, but judges may legitimately consult materials like
committee reports or floor statements in the search for intent where the language is ambiguous.” Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6
(1998).
In his history of statutory interpretation, Blatt notes discussions of the intent approach in
Kent’s Commentaries and cites its use in early nineteenth century cases. Blatt, supra note 17, at
809. See also Manning, supra note 20, at 103 (“By the late nineteenth century . . . the Supreme
Court had firmly settled on the idea that the federal judge’s duty was to implement the legislature’s intent.”).
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Purpose-based approaches to statutory interpretation can be
23
traced as far back as Heydon’s Case in 1584, but their immediate
American roots are in the legal process theories of Hart and Sacks.24
In their materials on “The Legal Process,” Hart and Sacks’ approach
to interpretation started from the proposition that each statute is a
purposive act. Questions of interpretation not answered by the text,
therefore, can be resolved by identifying the purpose of the statute
and interpreting the statute in light of the purpose.25 In contrast to the
intentionalist approach, which looks to discover what the legislature
thought about a specific problem at the time of enactment, the purposive approach looks to the broader purpose of the statute to discover how the legislature would have dealt with unforeseen issues.
Like the other approaches, purposivism usually looks to sources created at the time of enactment to resolve questions of interpretation.
Because of their potential relevance to examinations of legislative intent or purpose, the documents generated during the legislative
process come into play as sources of assistance whenever the inquiry
26
moves beyond the enacted text of a statute. In the 1980s, as proponents of “new textualism” argued that judicial interpreters should not
go beyond statutory text,27 American courts’ reliance on legislative
28
history became a focus of criticism and commentary, both from the

23. 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584). See Blatt, supra note 17, at 828-834 (emphasizing role of
Heydon’s case); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political
History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 256 (1998) (“Purposive interpretation traces its roots to Heydon’s Case. . . .”); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 538-540 (1947).
24. See generally Hart & Sacks, supra note 8. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 332-333 (1990).
On the general influences of legal process scholarship on the study of legislation, see Eskridge,
Jr. & Frickey, supra note 16, at 694-701.
25. Hart & Sacks, supra note 8, at 1374. See also Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 24, at 333.
26. Kenneth Starr cites the “American rule, which smiles upon and ordains the use of legislative historical materials in the interpretive process.” Starr, supra note 13, at 373. See also
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 11 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL. 59, 60 (1988) (“The common uses of legislative history assume that intent matters.”);
William T. Mayton, Law among the Pleonasms: The Futility and Aconstitutionality of Legislative
History in Statutory Interpretation, 41 EMORY L.J 113, 143 (1992) (“intent seems to be the major
justification for the use of legislative history.”).
27. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers,
53 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1457, 1458-59 (2000) (“Legislative history is the ultimate bugaboo of
the textualists. . .”).
28. William Eskridge provided the label “new textualism” in a 1990 article. See Eskridge,
Jr., supra note 20, at 623. The literature is filled with discussions of textualist critiques of the
uses of legislative history and the responses of those defending its use. For recent examples, see
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bench (most notably in opinions of Justice Scalia),29 and in the legal
academy.30

CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 153-186 (2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The
Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1301-02 (1998);
Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency Rules, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 255, 266 -273 (2000). See generally Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative
History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK L. REV. 807 (1998).
29. See, e.g., INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Chisom
v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. The new textualism debates helped initiate what Daniel Farber called “something of a
renaissance of scholarship about statutory interpretation,” Daniel Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEORGETOWN L.J. 281, 281 (1989), with scholars writing
both for their colleagues and for the attention of the judiciary. For a list of articles published
between 1988 and 1997 and a discussion of their impact on the courts, see Gregory Scott Crespi,
The Influence of a Decade of Statutory Interpretation Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU L. REV. 9 (2000). See also Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the
Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 679 (1999).
A sizeable portion of the recent scholarship has focused on legislative history. See, e.g.:
Robert J. Araujo, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation: A Recurring Question–Clarification or Confusion?, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 551 (1992); Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991); Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History without Legislative Intent: the Public Justification Approach to
Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO STATE L. J. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Bell I]; Bernard W. Bell, RE-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253
(2000); Breyer, supra note 13; James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1994); Jorge L.
Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 9 JURIMETRICS J. 294 (1982); Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy
Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000);
George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates and other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 39; Dickerson (1983), supra note 3; Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State
Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 161 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History
Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441 (1990-91); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365 (1990-91); Eskridge, Jr., Supreme Court, supra note 28; Orrin
Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J. LAW & SOC. POL.
43 (1988); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Note, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of
Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 401 (1994); Michael H. Koby, The
Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. LEGIS. 369 (1999); Kozinski, supra note 28; Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret
Decline of Legislative History: Has Someone Heard a Voice Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 PUB.
INT. L. REV. 57; MAMMEN, supra note 28; Garth L. Mangum, Legislative History in the Interpretation of Law: An Illustrative Case Study, 1983 BYU L. REV. 281; John F. Manning, Putting
Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529 (2000);
John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); Mayton, supra note 26; Noah, supra note 28; Daniel R. Ortiz, The Self-Limitation of Legislative
History: An Intrainstitutional Perspective, 12 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 232 (1992); Schacter, supra
note 22; Peter C. Schanck, An Essay on the Role of Legislative Histories in Statutory Interpreta-
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B. Other Common Law Jurisdictions
In general, legal systems outside the United States impose few
restrictions on the admissibility of extrinsic materials for statutory interpretation, including legislative documents (or travaux prépara31
toires). The interpretive weight of legislative materials varies, however, depending on the form of the documentation, the circumstances
under which the materials were presented, and the status of the
speaker or writer.32 Now-Justice Stephen Breyer has noted that outside the United States, courts have developed “other institutions to

tion, 80 LAW LIBR. J. 391 (1988); Schanck, supra note 16; Siegel, supra note 27; Slawson, supra
note 13; Harold P. Southerland, Theory and Reality in Statutory Interpretation, 15 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 1 (2002); Starr, supra note 13; Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative
History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205; Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and
the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1833 (1998); Patricia Wald, supra note 11; Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1888-89 Term of the United States Supreme
Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 ( 1990); Stephanie Wald, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation Cases in the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 23 SW. L. REV. 47 (1993);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding
Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990); Jesse M. Barrett, Note, Legislative History, the Neutral Dispassionate Judge, and Legislative Supremacy: Preserving the Latter
Ideals through the Former Tool, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819 (1998); Allison C. Giles, Note,
The Value of Nonlegislators’ Contributions to Legislative History, 79 GEORGETOWN L.J. 359
(1990); Lori L. Outzs, Note, A Principled Use of Congressional Floor Speeches in Statutory Interpretation, 28 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 297 (1995); Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia’s Use
of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990
DUKE L.J. 160; Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1992).
For indications of the federal government’s interest in courts’ uses of legislative history, see
Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990); U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Using and Misusing Legislative History: A Re-evaluation of the Status of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation (1989).
31. See Robert S. Summers & Michelle Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative Analysis,
IN INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 461, 476 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991). The book includes individual chapters on statutory interpretation
practices in several European jurisdictions, the United States, and Argentina. See also Stig
Strömholm, Legislative Material and Construction of Statutes: Notes on the Continental Approach, 10 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 173, 176 (1966).
32. Summers & Taruffo, supra note 31, at 476-477. Summers and Taruffo also point out
that the use of travaux préparatoires is facilitated in some systems through publication of accessible basic documents that draw together the materials relevant to interpreting a statute. In
others (such as the United States), the documents are less accessible and costlier to identify and
present. Id. at 477.
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bring about and maintain necessary interpretive consistency and coherence.” 33
Plucknett’s history of the common law traces the history of
common-law approaches to the use of legislative materials in statutory interpretation to the middle of the eighteenth century, when
English courts concluded that statutes could be construed only “in the
34
light of strictly professional learning.” The first reference to the exclusion of parliamentary materials appears in the 1769 case of Millar
35
v. Taylor, which established the principle that judges could refer neither to parliamentary debates nor to earlier versions of bills than the
version enacted. Plucknett observed that no authority was cited for
the proposition in Millar, nor were the facts that parliamentary debates were not officially reported and that their unofficial reporting
was probably inaccurate cited as reasons for the rule.36 Following
Millar, however, “the prevailing rule in England and in the Englishspeaking Commonwealth [was] that legislative intent has to be ascertained from within the four corners of the statutory text. . . . Evidence
37
of legislative intent is generally inadmissible.”
33. Breyer, supra note 13, at 868 (noting that in England the corps of professional drafters
in the Office of Parliamentary Counsel understands how the English judiciary interprets statutes
and drafts legislation to reinforce the judiciary’s interpretive tendencies).
34. THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 335 (5th ed.
1956). The development of English approaches to interpretation was also influenced by the historical overlapping between the legislative and judicial functions in parliament. See Manning,
supra note 20, at 43-47. See also Eskridge Jr., supra note 17, at 998-1009 (discussing pre-1776
interpretive practices of English courts).
35. 4 Burr. 2303, 2332 (1769) (“The sense and meaning of an act of parliament must be
collected from what it says when passed into a law, and not from the history of changes it underwent in the house where it took its rise. That history is not known to the other house, or to
the sovereign.”).
36. PLUCKNETT, supra note 34, at 335. In a 1991 article, Baade discusses whether the English “no-recourse rule was actually a “common-law canon of statutory construction” or simply a
reflection of the “then-current lack of legislative documentation?” Baade, supra note 30, at
1011-1012.
37. Baade, supra note 30, at 1007. For an enumeration of the reasons behind the exclusionary rule, see Francis Bennion, Hansard–Help or Hindrance? A Draftsman’s View of Pepper
v. Hart, 14 STAT. L. REV. 149, 151-155 (1993). Among the reasons, Bennion cites unreliability
of the materials, as well as the additional costs to litigation of accessing them. Id. at 154-155.
Justice Frankfurter found the English rules to be “too simple. . .disregard[ing] the fact that the
enactments are, as it were, organisms which exist in their environment.” Frankfurter, supra
note 23, at 541.
One exception to the rule, justified by reference to Heydon’s Case, allowed courts to examine pre-legislative reports of commissions and white papers for insight into the general purpose of legislation, but not for evidence of the intended meaning of enacted language. See Michael P. Healy, Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation in England and the United States:
An Assessment of the Impact of Pepper v. Hart, 35 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 231, 236-237 (1999). See

6DANNER

Special Issue 2003]

09/10/03 4:13 PM

JUSTICE JACKSON’S LAMENT

161

In the twentieth century, the exclusionary or “no-recourse” rule
was often critiqued and challenged by members of the judiciary and
others, but survived the Joint Commissions report on interpretive
38
practices in 1969, as well as later studies of British drafting and interpretation practices.39 Critics noted that, despite the rule, judges occasionally cited to what was said in parliamentary debate40 and that
there was nothing to prevent judges from surreptitiously reviewing
parliamentary materials, even if they could not acknowledge the materials in their opinions.41 It was also noticed in England that, by the
1990s, other Commonwealth common-law jurisdictions had managed
to relax their applications of the exclusionary rule “without indulging
in the excessive recourse to the legislative record exemplified by
42
United States courts.”
In 1992, through its decision in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v.
43
Hart, the House of Lords relaxed the exclusionary rule to make Parliamentary material that “clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or
the legislative intention”44 admissible under certain conditions. Pepper v. Hart established a two-part test requiring both that the text be
“ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity,” and that the material cited “clearly discloses the mischief
aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or
obscure words.”45 In his opinion, Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted further that “I cannot foresee that any statement other than the state-

generally William S. Jordan, III, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Relevance
of English Practice, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1994).
38. Joint Commissions Report, supra note 1.
39. See Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Pepper v. Hart Revisited, 15 STAT. L. REV. 10, 10-11
(1994); David Miers, Barking up the Wrong Tree: Determining the Intention of Parliament, 13
STAT. REV. 50, 50-51, 60 (1992).
40. Miers, supra note 39, at 51.
41. See Lord Lester, supra note 39, at 17 (noting that Parliament “could not control what
the Law Lords read at bedtime, in their baths, or even in the library of the House of Lords”). In
addition, the rules of interpretation have allowed advocates and courts to cite learned treatises
in briefs and in opinions, providing a means for referencing parliamentary materials quoted in
the treatises. See Robert G. Vaughn, A Comparative Analysis of the Influence of Legislative
History on Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation, 7 IND. INT’L. AND COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 n.
31 (1996).
42. Lord Lester, supra note 39, at 14 (discussing uses of legislative materials in Australia,
Canada, India, and New Zealand). See also Bennion, supra note 37, at 156-159 (discussing Australia, Canada, and New Zealand).
43. 1993 App. Cas. 593 (1992).
44. Id. at 634.
45. Id.
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ment of the minister or other promoter of the bill is likely to meet
these criteria.”46
The rule in Pepper v. Hart seems to presume that recourse to
legislative history will be unusual, perhaps because of the skills of the
drafters of legislation and their understanding of judicial expecta47
tions. In the immediate wake of the decision, librarians and others
raised concerns about whether such materials as standing committee
debates (the likely sources of statements regarding the intended effect of particular language) were sufficiently available to lawyers and
the public, as well as about the cost implications of the new rule for
solicitors and for libraries.48 In response to these concerns, and perhaps to limit the use of parliamentary materials, a 1995 Practice Note
requires all parties intending to cite parliamentary proceedings to
provide copies of the extract and a summary of arguments to be based
49
on the materials to all other parties and the court.
Pepper v. Hart’s long-term impact on the use of parliamentary
materials for statutory interpretation in English courts is not certain.
Although the approach outlined in Pepper seems designed to limit the
circumstances under which legislative materials can be cited, as well
as what materials will have probative value, at least a few later cases
indicate that judges have been willing to consider evidence from legislative history, regardless of whether the text in question was am50
biguous or obscure.

46. Id. In 1995, the Law Lords stated that “the only materials which can properly be introduced are clear statements made by a minister or other promoter of the Bill directed to the very
point in question.” Melluish (Inspector of Taxes) v. B.M.I., 1996 App. Cas. 454, 481 (1995).
47. See Garrett, supra note 30, at 691 (The English Office of Parliamentary Counsel “is a
powerful institution structured to mediate between the drafting of legislation and the background rules used by judges to understand the legislation.”). See also Patrick S. Atiyah, Judicial-Legislative Relations in England, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL
COMITY 129, 156 (Robert Katzmann ed. 1988).
48. See Guy Holborn, Pepper v. Hart and Parliamentary Standing Committee Debates, 24
THE LAW LIB’N 141 (1993). Holborn also expressed concern over possible problems in accessing proceedings on private bills and on early (pre-1909) debates, noting that Pepper “put no
time limits on the age of the statute that might need to be interpreted.” Id. at 142.
49. Practice Note, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 192, 193. (S. Ct.)
50. See Healy, supra note 37, at 248-250. For post-Pepper comparisons of uses of legislative history in England, Canada, and the U.S., see Gordon Bale, Parliamentary Debates and
Statutory Interpretation: Switching on the Light or Rummaging in the Ashcans of the Legislative
Process, 74 CAN. B. REV./LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN 1 (1995).
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C. Documents of Legislative History
In the United States, particularly at the national level, the legislative process generates a large amount and variety of material, much
of which is published and is available for later examination when the
51
statute is interpreted. Although the legal literature usually focuses
on how these materials are used as legislative history, most of the
documents themselves are not prepared (at least primarily) for later
use by courts in interpreting the law, but to provide explanations to
legislators voting on the bills and to fulfill procedural requirements,52
or “for other audiences, such as interest groups, constituents, and the
53
press.” Because the enactment process encourages participation, the
documents are heterogeneous both by type and by source. Alternative bills and amendments to bills can be introduced by all members
and all members are free to state their understandings of the meaning
and intent of the legislation during debate and at other points in the
process.54 In Congress, most of the statements are recorded and pre55
served.
51. A study of materials cited in statutory cases decided by the Supreme Court from 18901990 identified thirty-nine kinds of legislative sources (counting statutes and different varieties
of committee reports or comments in debate). Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in
Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1092, 1138-39 (1992). A
current casebook provides a “partial list” of twenty sources. See OTTO J. HETZEL ET AL.,
LEGISLATIVE LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 589-590 (3d
ed. 2001).
52. See Schacter, supra note 22, at 51 (noting that legislative scholars see committee reports
as “primarily directed at a congressional audience, and as intended to persuade other legislators
to support a bill . . .”). See also WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE
POLICY PROCESS 102 (5th ed. 2001).
53. Vermeule suggests that legal scholars might overestimate “the effects of judicially developed interpretive doctrine on legislators’ behavior, especially on legislators’ production of
statutory text and legislative history.” Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
74, 94-95 (2000). See also Bell I, supra note 30, at 9-23 (arguing that the creation of legislative
history is part of the legislature’s responsibility to explain its actions to the public). But see a
1989 Congressional Research Service report on courts’ uses of legislative history noting that “[a]
major purpose of the report is to assist Members and staff in determining where their best
chance (short of amendment) is to influence interpretation of legislation.” George A. Costello,
Sources of Legislative History as Aids to Statutory Construction 1 (1989) (CRS Report 89-86
A).
54. See generally OLESZEK, supra note 52, at 75-108 (describing preliminary legislative actions in Congress).
55. Other systems generate fewer documents and less variety. In England, legislative history is considered to include: antecedents (earlier statutes); pre-parliamentary materials (reports
of committees and commissions); and parliamentary materials (bill texts, records of committee
deliberations, and parliamentary debates). See Vaughn, supra note 41, at 7. The English legislative process and the materials are presented in detail in GUY HOLBORN, BUTTERWORTHS
LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE 123-156 (2d ed. 2001).
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Which of the documents are considered to be most useful for
statutory interpretation? In general, the most important documents of
legislative history are defined to include: the original and later
amended versions of the bill which eventually became law; various
documents generated by Congressional committees, including studies
by committee staff, transcripts of hearings before committees and
subcommittees, records of markup sessions (when available) and
committee reports; records of debates on the floors of the House and
Senate; and conference committee reports. In the twentieth century,
U.S. courts eventually came to consider all of this material admissible
as evidence of legislative intent,56 recognizing that some categories of
materials are more reliable sources of legislative intent than others,
and that within the categories, some individual sources are more reliable than others.57 Committee reports are generally considered to be
more reliable sources of legislative intent than statements made during debate on the floor of the House or Senate, because of the politicking and sales talk that enter into the debates.58 Yet, some statements made during debate are thought to be more valuable than
others. The comments of the floor manager of a bill or the chair of
the subcommittee that considered it will usually be given more weight
than statements of members who did not work on the bill, or those of
an original sponsor who lost contact with the bill after it was first introduced.59 Judges weigh the usefulness of possibly relevant statements in light of their own assumptions and understanding of the leg-

56. Commentators have noted the difficulties involved in limiting consideration to only
some types of documents, e.g. reports and sponsor statements. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 20,
at 685 (“[O]nce you open the door to consideration of legislative history it is hard to exclude
any type of evidence without viewing it in the context of the whole story.”). See also ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 35-36 (1997)
(“Since there are no rules as to how much weight an element of legislative history is entitled to,
it can usually be relied upon or dismissed with equal plausibility.”).
57. For a review of the materials and discussion of their relative values for interpretation,
see generally Costello, supra note 30; Costello, supra note 53. Vermeule finds the “abstract
character of the hierarchy” to be “both poorly theorized and practically unstable.” Vermeule,
Legislative History, supra note 30, at 1880. Since the Reagan administration, the relationships
among the sources have been further complicated by questions regarding the uses of presidential signing statements as evidence of legislative intent. See, e.g., William Popkin, Judicial Use of
Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991).
58. See generally Costello, supra note 30, at 50-57. For a Congress member’s take on the
strategic uses of comments in debate, see William S. Moorhead, A Congressman Looks at the
Planned Colloquy and Its Effect in the Interpretation of Statutes, 45 A.B.A.J. 314 (1959).
59. For a list of factors adding credibility to legislators’ statements, see Hatch, supra note
30, at 48-49. See also Outzs, supra note 30, at 325-329.
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islative process.60 The open admissibility of all varieties of legislative
history has long been subject to criticisms, both in the United States
and abroad.61
This article focuses on uses of legislative debates and committee
reports, traditionally the two primary sources of information about
legislative intent, as well as those generally accorded the most weight
62
for interpretation. They would also have been the sources most
likely to be available for citation by nineteenth century courts.
1. Legislative Debates. Although the Constitution requires that
63
each house of Congress keep a journal of its proceedings, it does not
require that the proceedings of Congress be recorded or published.
The journals, which have been kept since 1789, record actions taken
in each house, and are described as “minute books or summaries of
64
the floor proceedings.” They do not include the texts of statements
or speeches, but do include information on introduction and passage
of bills.65 Government publication of Congressional proceedings and
debates began only on March 5, 1873 with the first issue of the Con-

60. For a critique of how well law schools do in helping their students develop understanding of the legislative process, see Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation–in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 803 (1983).
61. Examples include the well-known statements of Judge Harold Leventhal that citing
legislative history is “akin to looking over a crowd and picking out your friends,” quoted in
Wald, supra note 11, at 214, and of Charles Curtis, who characterized legislative history as
“rummaging among the ashcans of the legislative process.” CHARLES CURTIS, IT’S YOUR LAW
52 (1954). The Canadian writer J.A. Corry once noted that a basic principle of statutory interpretation in the United States is “not [to] look at the act unless the legislative history is obscure!” J.A. Corry, The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes, 32 CAN. BAR
REV. 624, 636 (1954). Corry’s jibe rose from the witty to the ironic, however, after the comment
of Justice Marshall in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe to the effect that the legislative
history of the statute involved was itself ambiguous, and that “because of the ambiguity, it is
clear that we [the Court] must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative
intent.” 401 U.S. 402, 413 n. 29 (1971).
62. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 28, at 274 (“For the most part, committee reports accompanying a bill and statements made by its sponsors during floor debates receive the highest
marks . . .”).
63. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 5, cl. 3.
64. Robert C. Byrd, Reporters of Debates and the Congressional Record (July 21, 1980) in
ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE 1789-1989: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE 311, 311 (1991). A late nineteenth-century commentator found the journals to
be “analogous to the minutes of an ordinary assembly.” William F. Willoughby, Government
Publications, YALE REV., Aug. 1896 at 143, 148 (listing the contents).
65. Despite these limitations, journals can be useful in early legislative history research.
See Richard J. McKinney, Compiling a Federal Legislative History from Older Records, AALL
SPECTRUM, Oct. 2001, at 20, 22.
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gressional Record. Prior to 1873, Congressional proceedings were recorded and published by private publishers.
Early Congressional attitudes toward reporting and publishing
proceedings have been described by a late nineteenth-century observer as one of “indifference and in some instances almost positive
66
hostility.” The primary historian of the early reporting and publication of Congressional debates, Elizabeth McPherson, explains Congress’s initial failure to provide for authentic reporting of its proceedings largely in terms of the lack of either English or American
precedents for full reporting.67 In England, parliamentary proceedings had not been published for several hundred years because of
long-standing antagonisms between parliament and the Crown. In
North America, colonial assemblies followed parliament by keeping
journals, but no other accounts, of their proceedings. The practice of
requiring only that journals be kept was followed by the first and second Continental Congresses, and then incorporated into the Constitution. When Congress met for its first session in 1789, newspaper reporters were allowed to witness and record deliberations in the House
of Representatives. The Senate, however, deliberated in secret until
December, 1795.68
One history of public printing in the United States suggests that,
although early House proceedings were “very fully reported” by
newspapers in New York and Philadelphia, the debates “were very
inaccurately reported, or printed, and . . . gave rise to many com69
plaints and much discussion in the House.” McPherson notes, too,
that Congress’s continuing attempts to regulate the reporting of its
debates (as well as its failure to subscribe to copies of the publications
covering the debates) contributed to the tendencies of newspapers

66. Willoughby, supra note 64, at 147.
67. Elizabeth G. McPherson, Reporting the Debates of Congress, 28 Q.J. OF SPEECH 141,
141 (1942). Other factors included the influences of partisan politics and the attitude of the contemporary press. Id.
68. Id. at 142. There were also no reports on Senate debates from November 17, 1800 to
January 6, 1802, because reporters were not initially admitted to the floor of the Senate after
Congress moved to Washington D.C. from Philadelphia. Id. at 142. See also Elizabeth G.
McPherson, The Southern States and the Reporting of Senate Debates, 12 J. SOUTHERN HIST.
223, 241 (1946).
69. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 100 YEARS GPO 1861-1961, at 10-11 (1961).
House debates were first reported in the Congressional Register, which drew concerns of partisan and inaccurate reporting in the first session of Congress in 1789. McPherson, supra note 67,
at 142.
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and other publications to carry only “running reports of the debates. . .colored to suit the political leanings of the editors.”70
In 1824, the privately-published Register of Debates became the
first publication “devoted entirely to congressional proceedings,” although it included only abstracts of debates “that the editors consid71
ered important.” The Register of Debates was published until 1837,
overlapping for a few years with the Congressional Globe (18331873), which was the immediate predecessor to, and model for, the
Congressional Record. Initially, the Globe, too, provided only abstracts of congressional debates, but by 1851, it was publishing something closer to verbatim accounts of the proceedings of both houses.72
In addition to being published while Congress was in session,73 both
the Register of Debates and the Globe were published in compilations
at the end of each session. In 1846, the publishers of the Register of
Debates completed publication of the Annals of Congress, an authorized compilation from various contemporary sources of “reconstructive abstracts”of Congressional proceedings from 1789-1824, thereby
closing the gap in coverage between the first Congress and the start of
the Register of Debates.74
McPherson divides the history of the publication of Congressional proceedings into two periods, marked by the decisions of the
Senate (in 1848) and the House (in 1850) to finance the transcription
75
and publication of the debates in each house. After these dates the
published records came closer to being verbatim accounts of the debates.76 However, by this time, the practices of allowing members to
70. McPherson, supra note 67, at 143. For a list of the “several short-lived publications”
that attempted to publish the debates, see id. at 144. For descriptions of the coverage of the National Intelligencer, a Washington newspaper that reported on Congressional proceedings, see
Elizabeth G. McPherson, Major Publications of Gales and Seaton, 31 Q.J. OF SPEECH 430, 430432 (1945); Byrd, supra note 64, at 312-313. See also Mildred L. Amer, The Congressional Record; Content, History and Issues 2-3 (1993) (CRS Report 93-60 GOV).
71. Amer, supra note 70, at 3. Amer found the reports in the Register of Debates to be
“more complete” than those in the National Intelligencer. See also McPherson, Major Publications, supra note 70, at 432-434.
72. McPherson, supra note 67, at 147.
73. In 1865, Congress provided for the daily publication of the Globe, as well as for its delivery to the members. Byrd, supra note 64, at 314.
74. Amer, supra note 70, at 4. According to McPherson, the editors of the Annals of Congress claimed that, while the debates were not necessarily reported literally, they were substantially accurate. McPherson, supra note 67, at 144.
75. Id. at 147.
76. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 123 (1999) (“[N]ineteenth-century legislative materials were not always accurate, although matters improved at the federal level with the
mid-century adoption of phonography, the approximation of verbatim reporting in the Congres-

6DANNER

168

09/10/03 4:13 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 13:151

revise their speeches before publication and to extend their remarks
by publishing speeches not actually delivered on the floor were already well-established77 and have continued to the current day.78
In the twenty-first century, the Congressional Record continues
to be published in print in a daily edition while Congress is in session
79
and in bound compilations at the end of each Congress. The daily
edition, but not the bound edition, is also available electronically
from 1985 to date on Westlaw and Lexis, and via such Internet services as the Library of Congress’s legislative information system, Thomas (1985 to date)80 and the Government Printing Office’s GPO Access (1995 to date).81
2. Committee Reports. Committee reports accompanying legislation to the floor of the House or Senate are written to explain the
82
legislation to voting members. After enactment these explanations
provide information about the meaning, intent, and purpose of the
sional Globe, and, in 1873, congressional authorization for the Government Printing Office to
publish the Congressional Record.”).
77. Amer traces the history of the tradition allowing members to revise, extend and insert
remarks into the records of debate back to the early 1800s. Amer, supra note 70, at 15-16. See
also U.S. Government Printing Office, supra note 69, at 11 (1961) (noting the practice of the
National Intelligencer to submit reports of proceedings for members to revise “at their leisure”).
78. The history of attempts to use font changes and other signals to differentiate spoken
from unspoken remarks is traced, along with the story of 1984 litigation to compel publication of
an accurate report of Congressional proceedings, in Joe Morehead, Congress and the Congressional Record: A Magical Mystery Tour, 13 SERIALS LIBR. 59 (1987). See also Byrd, supra note
64, at 320-321.
Since 1995, the Rules of the House of Representatives have allowed members to make only
“technical, grammatical, and typographical corrections” to their remarks on the floor. See H.R.
Rule XVII, para. 9(a)(2001). Yet, immediately after the new rule was instituted, the New York
Times found significant differences between tape-recorded and published versions of a House
debate regarding a book contract entered into by the Speaker. See Michael Wines, How the Record Tells the Truth Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, sec. 4, at 7.
79. McKinney, supra note 65, at 21. Because the federal government now relies on electronic information formats for its depository library program, the bound compilations of the
Congressional Record are now distributed only to regional depositories or to one library in each
state without a regional depository. See Essential Titles for Use in Paper Format, at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/fdlp/pubs/estitles.html (last visited July 12, 2002). See also Karrie
Peterson, et al., Government Documents at the Crossroads, AM LIBR., Sept. 2001, at 52 (criticizing the move toward electronic-only publication of depository publications).
80. http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
81. http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/index.html (last revised Sept. 12, 2002).
82. See OLESZEK, supra note 52, at 102. See also Thomas F. Broden, Congressional Committee Reports: Their Role and History, 33 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 209, 210 (1958) (“The legislative role of the written committee report cannot be overemphasized”). For a detailed description of the elements of the typical committee report, see Jerrold Zwirn, Congressional
Committee Reports, 7A GOVERNMENT PUBS. REV. 319, 321-322 (1980).
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statutory text, and have traditionally been viewed as the most trusted
and reliable sources of information on legislative intent. As described
in the current edition of a standard guide: “Committees are the infrastructure of Congress. They are where the bulk of legislative work is
done–where expertise resides, where policies incubate, where most
legislative proposals are written or refined. . . .”83 Citation studies
have shown that committee reports are cited more often in Supreme
84
Court decisions than other legislative history sources, and the Court
has often noted the authoritative value of committee reports for in85
terpretation. Even Justice Jackson’s criticisms of legislative history
did not extend to committee reports,86 and it is notable that Justice
Scalia included committee reports within his general critique of legislative history.87
Judge Kozinski has pointed out, however, that “[w]hile committee reports and hearing transcripts are now so common that hardly a
piece of federal legislation comes into being without its own printed
88
legislative record, this was not always so.” In the early nineteenth
century, written committee reports were produced infrequently and
were less important to the process of enactment than they became in
the twentieth century. Initially, both the Senate and House usually
operated not through standing committees that developed and
drafted bills, then reported them to the floor for consideration with
accompanying explanations, but through select or special committees
appointed to draft specific pieces of legislation after preliminary debate and agreement on the floor.89 Under this approach there was
less need for written explanations, other than at times for private
83. 1 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 535 (5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
CQ GUIDE].
84. Carro and Brann’s often-referenced study of the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history from 1938-1979 and Michael Koby’s 1980-1998 updating of the study both found that committee reports were the most cited items. Carro & Brann, supra note 30, at 299; Koby, supra
note 30, at 390. See also Costello, Average Voting Members, supra note 30, at 43-50.
85. See, e.g., Thornberg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44, n. 7 (1986) (“We have repeatedly recognized that the authoritative source of legislative intent lies in the committee reports on the
bill.”); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) (“A committee report represents the considered
and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed
legislation.”).
86. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.384, 395 (1951) (Jackson J., concurring) (“. . . I think we should not go beyond Committee reports, which presumably are well
considered and carefully prepared”).
87. See SCALIA, supra note 56, at 34-35.
88. Kozinski, supra note 28, at 810.
89. For the early procedures in the House, see Broden, supra note 82, at 220. The committees were dissolved after submitting the bills for consideration.
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bills.90 The standing committee system was established gradually
during the first half of the nineteenth century, then expanded during
the latter half, with the number of Congressional committees peaking
in 1913.91
As the role of committees became more important, the practice
of relying on written reports for private claims bills grew, first in the
92
House. The increasing numbers of reports on private legislation established the basic format for committee reports that continued into
93
the twentieth century. Before 1880, however, although written reports were used increasingly for private bills, no committees made
general use of reports for public bills.94 Only since 1880 has the
House of Representatives required that each bill–public or private—
reported from committee be accompanied by a written report, and
only since the turn of the twentieth century has the Senate followed
95
the practice of submitting reports for most bills. Senate rules still do
not require that written reports accompany legislation.96
In addition to being published individually as issued, Congressional committee reports on legislation are also included in the consecutively numbered series of Congressional (and other) publications
known as the Serial Set, or the Congressional Series. In the twentieth
century, as written reports became more common, and as their importance for legislative history research grew, committee reports became
more available in commercial publications, selectively in West’s
United States Code Congressional and Administrative News (1941 to
date), and later more comprehensively in microform sets; on Lexis
97
and Westlaw (1990 to date) ; and through the Library of Congress’s
Thomas web site and the Government Printing Office’s GPO Access
(1995 to date).

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 216.
1 CQ Guide, supra note 83, at 543-544.
Broden, supra note 82, at 221-222.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 215.
OLESZEK, supra note 52, at 102.
Westlaw also includes selected reports from 1948-1989.
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III. NINETEENTH-CENTURY USES OF LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. English Approaches and Common-Law Traditions
At the turn of the nineteenth century, American courts looked
for help in statutory interpretation neither to the few available committee reports nor to what might have been said in Congressional debates. In the first years after independence, the traditional attitudes
of the English courts toward legislation and the English approach to
statutory interpretation colored the approaches of courts in other
common-law countries, including the United States.98 H. Jefferson
Powell has identified “[t]he two most obvious sources of hermeneutical wisdom” as “the anti-interpretive tradition of Anglo-American
Protestantism and the accumulated interpretive techniques of the
99
common law.”
Powell found that by the early nineteenth century the commonlaw tradition in hermeneutics had focused on identification of the in100
Yet, although both
tent behind written texts, including statutes.
English and American courts purported to attend to the subjective intentions of the drafters of legislation to locate evidence of intent,
judges looked nowhere else than at the text of the statute or its common-law background.101 As Willard Hurst wrote: “From about 1820
to 1890 the growth of common law captured the ambition and imagination of judges and legal writers to the extent that they tended to
identify this sector as the true law compared with which legislation

98. See Baade, supra note 30, at 1009 (“It seems safe to assume . . .that the English common-law rule barring recourse to legislative history in aid of statutory interpretation prevailed
[in the colonies] before the Declaration of Independence (1776), and that the decision laying
down the ‘English rule’ was well known at the time of the framing of the Constitution.”).
99. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 889 (1985). Richard Posner also found two strands of thinking dominating both England
and the United States in the nineteenth century. One, the stronger, was distrust of legislation
and was embodied in the maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law were to be narrowly construed; the other, stemming from Francis Lieber, emphasized the problematic aspects
of interpretation. Richard Posner, Legislation and its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV.
431, 433 (1989). On Lieber, see infra text accompanying notes 114-118.
100. Powell, supra note 99, at 894. See Schooner Paulina’s Cargo v. U.S., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
52, 60 (1812) (“In construing these laws, it has been truly stated to be the duty of the court to
effect the intention of the legislature.”) In the first volume of his Commentaries on American
Law, Kent stated that the object of interpretation “is to discover the true intention of the law,”
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 437 (1826).
101. See Powell, supra note 99, at 897 (“The modern practice of interpreting a law by reference to its legislative history was almost wholly nonexistent . . .”).

6DANNER

172

09/10/03 4:13 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 13:151

was marginal, exceptional, and indeed intrusive.”102 Writers in both
England and the United States saw “strict judicial adherence to the
legislature’s language as a constitutional necessity.”103 Yoo’s study of
the Marshall Court’s approaches to interpretation found that, although the Court looked for assistance to such extrinsic sources as
statutes in pari materia and the common law, there was not “a single
104
instance . . . where a Justice resorted to legislative history.”
Baade’s study of nineteenth century decisions indicates that the
English rule allowing no recourse to legislative expressions was in
place in the United States “for the first four decades of the nineteenth
105
Baade concluded his analysis of early state and federal
century.”
cases, and U.S. Attorney General opinions, with a discussion of the
106
1845 Supreme Court decision in Aldridge v. Williams, in which Justice Taney’s opinion for the Court rejected the use of statements in
107
debate as evidence of legislative intent. Baade cites the use of
House committee documents in the 1860 decision in Dubuque & Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield108 as the Supreme Court’s first resort to
109
legislative history in statutory interpretation, but he (and other recent students of the Court’s use of legislative materials) have found
few other uses of committee reports or statements in debate before
the 1890s.110 A 1992 Harvard Law Review note also pointed to
Litchfield, finding that the “legislative history was used for the first

102. JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 41-42 (1982).
103. Powell, supra note 99, at 898. For discussions of early federal court interpretive practices, see Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the State, supra note 20, at 85-102; Eskridge, Jr.,
All About Work, supra note 17, at 1058-1087.
104. See John Choon Yoo, Marshall’s Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607, 1613, n. 37 (1992). For other discussion of the Marshall Court’s
approaches to interpretation, see POPKIN, supra note 76, at 73-80; Manning, Textualism and the
Equity of the State, supra note 20, at 86-102; Eskridge Jr., All About Work, supra note 17, at
1070-1082.
105. Baade, supra note 30, at 1025.
106. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9 (1845).
107. Baade, supra note 30, at 1032.
108. 64 U.S. (23 How.) 66 (1860).
109. Baade, supra note 30, at 1079.
110. Baade also cites the later cases of Gardner v. The Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499
(1868) (House journal); The Collector v. Richards, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 246 (1874) (Senate committee report); Blake v. National Banks, 90 U.S. (Wall.) 307 (1874) (journals); Jennison v. Kirk,
98 U.S. 453 (1879) (Senate debates) as additional instances of the court’s use of legislative history before 1892. Baade, supra note 30, at 1079-1081. See also Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 97, n. 182 (1998) (citing Blake, Jennison);
Chomsky, supra note 30, at 944 (citing Blake, Jennison); Vermeule, Legislative History, supra
note 30, at 1836, n. 14 (citing Blake, Jennison, Richards).
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time outside the context of a private bill when the Supreme Court relied on both a committee report and floor statements to construe an
act.”111
B. Contemporary Treatises and Other Commentary
According to Powell,”the sixty years following 1800 saw a remarkable outpouring of scholarly discussion of hermeneutical issues
112
in both Great Britain and America.” Within this literature can be
found the first of the great treatises on legislation and statutory interpretation, shorter monographs on techniques of interpretation, and
discussions of how statutes should be treated in the more comprehensive works of Kent, Bentham, and others.113 While acknowledging the
central role of legislative intent, none of the nineteenth-century treatises on statutory interpretation endorsed the use of legislative history
as a means for divining intent.
In the United States, the first full-length edition of Francis Lie114
ber’s Legal and Political Hermeneutics was published in 1839. Lieber’s work was cited in all later nineteenth century American works

111. Note, Learned Hand, supra note 30, at 1009. The note also cited Blake, Jennison, Richards, id. at 1011 nn. 33-34; and identified instances in which the U.S. Attorney General opinions relied on legislative history to interpret private laws. Id. at 1009.
112. Powell, supra note 99, at 900.
113. For discussion of nineteenth century American treatises on statutory interpretation, see
Baade, supra note 30, at 1064-1068; POPKIN, supra note 76, at 62-73. For discussions of the major treatises on statutory interpretation see Paul H. Sanders & John W. Wade, Legal Writings on
Statutory Construction, 3 VANDERBILT L. REV. 569 (1950); Richard A. Danner, From the Editor: Books about Statutes, 79 LAW LIBR. J. 361 (1987) (reviewing contemporary English, Canadian and U.S. treatises). See also JOHN W. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE, 1908-1940,
at 74-75 (1981) for a discussion of the “anti-legislation” attitudes of some nineteenth century
treatise-writers.
On the general development and role of legal treatises in the nineteenth century, see generally A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of
Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632 (1981); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN BAR 540-563 (1911). Baade writes that nineteenth-century treatises “were not always entirely accurate in their statements of current American jurisprudence, but they furnish at
least some insight into professional opinion then prevailing. Furthermore, the rules set forth in
treatises (accurate or not) entered into the stream of jurisprudence through judicial citation.”
Baade, supra note 30, at 1063. See also ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
PUBLISHING 129 (1990) ( “legal texts are rarely examined by those interested in American legal
history, . . . , but this literature does reflect what the contemporary profession thought to be the
applicable rules of law.”).
114. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (Enlarged ed. 1839). An
earlier version was published in the American Jurist in 1837 and 1838. A third edition was published in 1880. See FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (William G.
Hammond, 3d. ed. 1880).
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on statutory interpretation.115 Lieber acknowledged intent as the basis of interpretation,116 although he said nothing about the potential
uses of extrinsic sources as aids to interpretation.117
A second influential early nineteenth century work devoted to
interpretation was Sir Fortunatus Dwarris’s A General Treatise on
118
Statutes. Dwarris wrote that “[t]he real intention. . . will always, in
statutes, prevail over the literal sense of the terms.”119 Blatt, though,
traces early formulations of what would become the American plain
meaning rule to the first edition of Dwarris, as well as to several
American cases preceding the first London edition of his book.120
By mid-century, other American treatises on interpretation contained early formulations of the plain meaning rule and the proposition that, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, then
interpretation is not needed at all. In 1848, E. Fitch Smith stated
“that it is only when there is some ambiguity or doubt arising from
other sources, that interpretation has its proper office, and that it is
121
only to be resorted to when there is obscurity as to the meaning.”
Smith, however, struggled with some of the questions that would be
raised by later critics of the plain meaning rule and other literal approaches to interpretation: given the “imperfection of human lan-

115. William G. Hammond, Preface to the Third Edition, in LIEBER (3d ed. 1880), supra
note 114, at iii (“its contents soon became the common property of our recent writers of lawbooks and special editions.”). Posner noted the influence of Lieber’s work, giving him credit for
bringing “news of German research in the problematics of interpretation” to the U.S., and notes
that the book continues to be cited. Posner, supra note 99, at 433. Lieber’s broader influences
on the American legal profession are discussed in PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF
DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1999).
116. LIEBER (1839), supra note 114, at 23.
117. Lieber did cite favorably the policies of the Bavarian penal code, which included publication of “the motives, explanations, &c., which were given in the course of discussions in the
king’s privy council, for adopting the various laws.” LIEBER (1839), supra note 114, at 41.
118. FORTUNATUS DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES AND THEIR RULES OF
CONSTRUCTION (1830-31) (Reprinted in part in 9 THE LAW LIBRARY (John Purdon ed. 1835).
A second English edition was published in 1848, see FORTUNATUS DWARRIS, A GENERAL
TREATISE ON STATUTES (2d. ed. 1848), and an American edition in 1871, see FORTUNATUS
DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES (Platt Potter ed. 1871). In 1847, J. G. Marvin
called Dwarris and Lieber the “only professed works upon interpretation and construction to be
found in the common law.” J. G. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, OR A THESAURUS OF
AMERICAN, ENGLISH, IRISH, AND SCOTCH LAW BOOKS 283 (1847).
119. DWARRIS (1835), supra note 118, at 192.
120. Blatt, supra note 17, at 812.
121. E. FITCH SMITH, COMMENTARIES ON STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 691 (1848).
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guage,” statutory drafters cannot “foresee all possible complex
cases.”122
Theodore Sedgwick’s Treatise on the Rules which Govern the In123
terpretation and Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law,
published in 1857, stated the plain meaning rule: “if the statute is
plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction or interpre124
tation,” but noted that, if interpretation is necessary, the object of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legisla125
Sedgwick cited the rule in Heydon’s Case to support the
ture.
court’s need to identify the previous state of the law as well as the
mischiefs the statute was enacted to correct, but noted that Lord
Coke provided no advice on the means to employ or the evidence to
consult in determining these factors.126 He pointed out, however, that
“We are not to suppose that the courts will receive evidence of extrinsic facts as to the intention of the legislature: that is, of facts which
have taken place at the time of, or prior to, the passage of the bill.”
Citing Justice Marshall’s opinion in Schooner Paulina’s Cargo v.
United States,127 Sedgwick stated that “the tendency of all our modern
decisions is to the effect that the intention of the legislature is to be
found in the statute itself, and that there only the judges are to look for
the mischiefs meant to be obviated, and the remedy to be provided.”128
Delivered in 1860, Vaughan Hawkins’s paper On the Principles
129
of Legal Interpretation dealt mainly with the interpretation of wills,
but offered comments on general interpretive principles, including
those applicable to statutes. Hawkins asked whether the true object
of inquiry in interpretation is the intention of the writer or the meaning of the words used in the document,130 and argued that reliance on
the meaning of words alone fails whenever what the words reveal is
131
not plain to the reader. Interpretation, therefore, must proceed on
122. Id. at 661.
123. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1857).
124. Id. at 231.
125. Id. at 229.
126. Id. at 241.
127. 7 Cranch 52, 60 (1812).
128. SEDGWICK, supra note 123, at 243.
129. F. Vaughan Hawkins, On the Principles of Legal Interpretation, in JAMES B. THAYER,
A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE IN THE COMMON LAW 577 ( 1898).
130. Hawkins, supra note 129, at 581.
131. Id. at 584-585.
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the basis of determining intent.132 Responding to this essay nearly
thirty years later, after its publication in Thayer’s treatise on evidence, Oliver Wendell Holmes disagreed with Hawkins’s analysis,
and was prompted to make his frequently-cited comment that, in interpreting statutes, “We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we
ask only what the statute means.133
The 1891 first edition of the major continuing American treatise
on statutory interpretation, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, began its discussion of interpretation and construction by stating that
134
“intent is the vital part, the essence of the law,” but moved quickly
to the plain meaning rule: “If a statute is plain, certain and unambiguous, so that no doubt arises from its own terms as to its scope and
meaning, a bare reading suffices; then interpretation is needless.”135 If
interpretation is necessary, its object is to ascertain the intent of the
136
legislature, and the statute itself is the first and best source of evidence of legislative intent.137 According to Sutherland, “The court
will not hear proof of extrinsic facts known to the legislature or members thereof which are supposed to indicate their intention in passing
a law.”138
The first edition of Henry Black’s Handbook on the Construction
and Interpretation of the Laws, an early entry in the West Publishing
Company Hornbook Series, was published in 1896. As stated by
Black, the goal of interpretation is “the meaning and intention of the
139
The interpreter looks first to the statute itself to relegislature.”
solve doubts and ambiguities, but if this proves unsuccessful may look
to “extraneous facts, considerations, and means of explanation. . .to
find the real meaning of the legislature.”140 What may be looked at?
Black described the general agreement of English and American
courts that legislative committee reports are not “pertinent evidence
132. Id. at 589.
133. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419
(1899). Zeppos describes the “battle for Holmes,” noting that Holmes is quoted on both sides
of the debate over the usefulness of legislative intent. Zeppos, supra note 51, at 1126-27. See
also Strauss, supra note 23, at 247-248.
134. J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 309 (1891).
135. Id. at 310.
136. Id. at 311.
137. Id. at 312.
138. Id. at 380. Sutherland does cite several instances where courts had cited legislative history. Id. at 382-384.
139. HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAWS 196 (1896).
140. Id. at 197.
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of the meaning which the legislature intended to attach to the statute.”141 The recently decided Holy Trinity Church case142 was cited for
the Supreme Court’s use of committee reports, and testimony before
143
committees, but the case is discussed in a section on uses of contemporary history, rather than within Black’s brief treatment of the
uses of committee reports.144 Black also provides a full treatment of
145
the rationale for excluding individual statements made in debate,
while noting instances where such statements in debate might have
argumentative force in interpretation and where they had been cited.
IV. EXPLANATIONS FOR INCREASED USE IN THE LATE
NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES
Despite the cautions offered by Sutherland, Black, and earlier
commentators, by the 1890s U.S. courts were entering a period of significant change in their approaches to statutory interpretation and attitudes toward the admissibility of non-textual sources of authority.
There are several explanations for why in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries it became acceptable to use legislative history in arguments about the meaning of statutory language.
A. Impacts of Holy Trinity Church v. United States
The recently intensified scholarly interest in statutory interpretation and courts’ uses of legislative history has prompted a number of
studies of the materials cited in Supreme Court opinions.146 For the
most part, the newer studies have analyzed citation patterns for fairly
recent terms of the Court,147 and do not extend into the nineteenth

141. Id. at sec. 91 at 226.
142. Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
143. BLACK, supra note 139, at 214.
144. Id. at 226.
145. Id. at 227 (citing Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9 (1845)).
146. In 1981, John W. Johnson wrote that “it is impossible to pinpoint an exact date at
which . . .the U.S. Supreme Court began to accept information gleaned from committee reports
and legislative debates for use in establishing ‘legislative intent.’” JOHNSON, supra note 113, at
78. Since that time, ready access to full-text databases of nineteenth century court opinions has
made it easier for researchers to identify the Court’s uses of legislative history and other sources
of authority in its older opinions.
147. See Carro & Brann, supra note 30 (1938 through 1979); ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 16
(1986-1991 terms); Koby, supra note 30 (1980 through 1998) (updating Carro & Brann); William
H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR.
J. 267 (2002) (1996 term) (includes decisions and briefs; covers other authorities); Thomas W.
Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994) (1992
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century.148 Reviewing these studies, Vermeule found that “[t]he most
recent work suggests that the Court’s use of legislative history rose
slowly between 1892 . . . and the Second World War, reached an apogee during the Burger Court, and declined sharply after Justice Scalia
joined the Court. . . . [It] was not used (or hardly ever used) before
1892. . . .”149
Most commentators have acknowledged that the Supreme
Court’s 1892 decision in Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United
150
States, was a turning point in the Court’s use of legislative history
for statutory interpretation.151 In Holy Trinity, Justice Brewer relied
term); Schacter, supra note 22 (1996 term); Patricia Wald, supra note 11 (1981 term); Patricia
Wald, supra note 30 (1988 term); Stephanie Wald, supra note 30 (1992 term).
148. Nicholas Zeppos’s study of 20 Supreme Court terms between 1890 and 1990 provides
data on legislative materials cited during the 1894 term. Zeppos, supra note 51, at 1096 (figure
3). Solan provides data on references to legislative history by decade from 1890-1899 through
1930-1939. Solan, supra note 110, at 99-102. Another long term study does not include legislative history within its coverage. See Wes Daniels, “Far Beyond the Law Reports:” Secondary
Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions; October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978,
76 LAW LIBR. J. 1 (1983).
For an analysis of sources cited in U.S. Supreme Court cases decided in 1899-1900, see
Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1673, 1686 (2000) (noting that in the several cases dealing with statutes the Court cited extensively from the text of the acts involved and was “doing legal analysis, not legal history”).
149. Vermeule, supra note 53, at 131-132.
150. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
151. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 30, at 434 n. 132 (citing Holy Trinity as “[t]he earliest
Supreme Court case commonly cited for the use of legislative history to construe a statute”);
Noah, supra note 28, at 261-262 (“The Court first clearly endorsed a departure from this tradition [the English rule against no consideration] in 1892.”); POPKIN, supra note 76, at 122 (Holy
Trinity marks “the onset of the use of conventional legislative history to interpret statutes”);
Solan, supra note 110, at 97 (“Church of Holy Trinity presaged a gradual change in the Supreme
Court’s methodology”); Strauss, supra note 23, at 246 (“Political history came into judicial use
as an interpretive aid in American courts before the turn of the [twentieth] century, more or less
simultaneously with the increased pace of legislation that accompanied the Progressive Era.”);
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, supra note 53, at 84 (citing Holy Trinity as “the first, or at least
the most famous, majority opinion to use a committee report to trump contrary statutory text”).
Although he cited the 1860 decision in Dubuque & Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield, 64 U.S.
(23 How.) 66 (1860), as the source of the Supreme Court’s first resort to legislative history in
statutory interpretation, Baade acknowledged Holy Trinity as one of a trilogy of cases decided
between 1892 and 1904 that “established more reliable guidelines for the use by federal courts
of legislative history.” Baade, supra note 30, at 1082. In addition to Holy Trinity, which he
notes is “now remembered mainly for its florid allusions to Christianity as the national religion,”
id. at 1083, for its use of committee reports, Baade cites U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (acquiescing in the doctrine that the debates are not appropriate
sources for the meaning of statutory language), and Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486 (1904)
(reconciling the two earlier decisions). Id. at 1083-1084. For discussions of other cases citing
legislative history prior to Holy Trinity, see Chomsky, supra note 30, at 945-946; MAMMEN, supra note 28, at 78-81; Solan, supra note 110, at 94; Vermeule, Legislative History, supra note 30,
at 1836; Note, Learned Hand, supra note 30, at 1009.
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in part on committee reports to determine that Congress could not
have intended to include the work of ministers within the phrase “labor or service of any kind” in the Alien Contract Labor Act.152
Eskridge describes the decision in Holy Trinity as “a sensation,”
which marked an immediate “sea change” in how legislative history
was used in the early twentieth century:
As a consequence [of Holy Trinity and its endorsement by contemporary commentators] legislative history became common in Supreme Court as well as lower federal court opinions in the early
twentieth century. The Court relied not only on committee reports,
but also on preliminary drafts of bills ultimately enacted, changes
made in legislation by committees or considered by the legislative
chamber, and statements made by sponsors or floor managers of
153
enacted bills.

New twentieth-century editions of Sutherland’s treatise and
Black’s hornbook each were notable for the changes in the discussions of American courts’ willingness to accept committee reports and
154
other legislative information as evidence of intention and meaning.
The 1904 second edition of Sutherland’s treatise, edited by John
Lewis, retained much of the text of Sutherland’s original edition, but
added a new section on the uses of legislative documents and proceedings in interpretation.155 While the first edition had discussed
legislative reports and journals within the limits posed by the rule in
Heydon’s Case, Lewis’s new section began with the proposition that
“[t]he proceedings of the legislature in reference to the passage of an
act may be taken into consideration in construing the act,”156 and continued by noting that committee reports “have been held to be proper
sources of information in ascertaining the intent or meaning of the
act.”157 Seven years later, the second edition of Black’s hornbook on
interpretation also acknowledged the change in American courts’
willingness to accept committee reports as evidence of intention and
meaning. In the discussion of committee reports (somewhat expanded from his first edition), Black noted that American courts were
152. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, sec. 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332.
153. ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 16, at 209.
154. The changes in the treatises are noted in Chomsky, supra note 30, at 948-949.
155. 2 J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 470 (John Lewis
2d. ed. 1904).
156. Id. at sec. 470 at 879.
157. Id. at sec. 470 at 880 (citing Holy Trinity and state cases). Lewis retained the text and
citations from the original edition regarding use of legislative journals, but expanded the original comments against using statements made in debate by quoting at length from the recently
decided United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (1897). Id. at sec. 470 at 882-83.
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now “inclining to the broader view that, if there is real doubt about
the meaning of the law, they are not debarred from consulting any
proper sources of information, including those which are of a quasi
official or authoritative nature.”158
By the 1930s, discussions of the Supreme Court’s increasing use
159
of legislative history had become a popular topic in the law reviews.
At the end of the decade, Harry Wilmer Jones could write that, despite the theoretical limitation posed by the plain meaning rule, “the
federal courts have come to make use of extrinsic aids in virtually
every case.”160 In 1942, the third revised edition of Yale Law Librarian Frederick C. Hicks’s treatise on the materials of legal research included for the first time a section on “Interpretation of Statutes by
Extrinsic Aids,”161 a topic not covered in the 1923 and 1932 editions.
B. Changing Attitudes toward “Extra-legal” Sources of Information
162
In American Legal Culture, 1908-1940, John W. Johnson explored changes in the availability of information and its uses by lawyers and the judiciary in the early twentieth century. After noting
that nineteenth century lawyers and judges “seldom ventured beyond
163
common law authority,” Johnson characterized the first decades of
the twentieth century as “the beginning of “an era dominated by in164
formation.” Johnson focused on the role of Louis Brandeis in cre-

158. HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
LAWS 311 (2d ed. 1911). The Holy Trinity case was still not mentioned within the discussion of committee reports, but was cited in an earlier section on construction according to “the
spirit and reason of the law.” Id. at 68.
159. See, e.g., Jacobus ten Broek, Comment, Admissibility of Congressional Debates in
Statutory Construction by the U.S. Supreme Court, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 326 (1937); J.P. Chamberlain, The Courts and Committee Reports, 1. U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 87 (1933); Markley Frankham,
Some Comments Concerning the Use of Legislative Debates and Committee Reports in Statutory
Interpretation, 2 BROOK. L. REV. 173 (1933); James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930); Charles B. Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative Intent established by Extrinsic Evidence, 20 B.U. L. REV. 173 (1933); Richard R. Powell, Construction of
Written Instruments (Continued), 14 IND. L.J. 309 (1939); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43
HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930); Warren H. Wagner, The Use and Abuse of Legislative History in the
Construction of a Statute, 5 I.C.C. PRACTITIONERS J. 485 (1938); Note, Legislative Materials to
Aid Statutory Interpretation, 50 HARV. L. REV. 822 (1937); K. M. McManes, Note, Effect of
Legislative History on Judicial Decision, 5 G.W. L. REV. 235 (1936).
160. Jones, supra note 19, at 25. See also Baade, supra note 30, at 1087-1089 (discussing connections between New Deal legislation and courts’ increased use of legislative history).
161. FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 80-82 (3d
rev. ed. 1942).
162. JOHNSON, supra note 113.
163. Id. at 17.
164. Id. at 29.
THE
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ating the intellectual basis for this shift through Brandeis’s references
to extra-legal sources of information in his briefs and opinions.165 He
also examined the generally growing impacts of authorities other than
cases and statutes in appellate opinions, quoting Max Radin’s 1928
observation that “There are scarcely ten pages of [volume 158 of the
Northeastern Reporter] in which some treatises do not appear and certainly not ten in which there is no reference to one of the many existing cyclopedias, repertories, handbooks, or digests or dictionaries.”166
Radin noted that most of these new (or newly recognized)
sources (encyclopedias, multi-volume treatises, annotated reporters,
the Restatements) were prepared, not to serve as authorities in their
own right, but in order to assist lawyers in finding and applying the
167
existing body of the common law. Yet, the growing general acceptance and use of secondary authorities in American court opinions
contributed also to judges’ willingness to use the materials of legislative history in interpreting and applying the growing body of statutory
law they were asked to deal with in the twentieth century. Like other
analysts of Supreme Court opinions from the first part of the century,
Johnson found that the Court’s citations to legislative history increased, slowly at first, then substantially during the 1930s. By the
late 1930s, legislative history was cited more frequently than any
other category of extra legal information.168 Greater use of Brandeisstyle briefs “provided a convenient medium for the recitation of legislative history,” and some observers found more value in the briefs’
references to legislative materials than in the social science data they
contained.169
C. Growing Importance of Legislation as a Source of Law
A large part of the reason for the growing acceptance of legislative history lies in the greater volume, broader scope, and increased
170
importance of legislation itself at the turn of the twentieth century.
In contrast to the tiny legislative output that characterized the first
171
years of the Republic, the later years of the nineteenth-century saw

165. Id. at 29-46.
166. Max Radin, Sources of Law–New and Old, 1 SO. CALIF. L. REV. 411, 416 (1928)
(quoted in JOHNSON, supra note 113, at 54).
167. Radin, supra note 166, at 417-418. See also JOHNSON, supra note 113, at 65.
168. JOHNSON, supra note 113, at 79.
169. Id. at 81.
170. ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 16, at 209.
171. See Frankfurter, supra note 23, at 527.
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the beginning of an outpouring of legislation that served in many
ways to displace the body of judge-made law.172 Willard Hurst noted
that for the first three quarters of the century, “[t]he bulk of the statute books consisted of highly particularized measures; statutes of
broad policy or general reach were relatively few and reflected little
bold programming or implementation.173 During the last decades of
the century, legislation to protect workers from the hazards of their
employment, regulation of commerce and public utilities, and various
forms of social legislation served to remove large areas of law from
174
common law coverage both in the United States and in England.
“[B]y the early twentieth century statute law had increased in reach
and density to become the central element of law, showing sustained
lines of policy as sturdy as judicial precedent.”175
The growth in legislative activity and the altered nature of the
legislative product had immediate and dramatic effects on the federal
courts. In 1947, Justice Frankfurter noted that while “as late as 1875
more than 40% of the controversies before the [Supreme] Court were
common-law litigation, fifty years later only 5%, while today cases

172. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
(“In [the last fifty to eighty years] we have gone from a legal system dominated by the common
law, divined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have become the primary source of law.”)
173. HURST, supra note 102, at 10. Hurst points out that in Wisconsin, “each year a pencilthin volume of ‘general’ laws stood dwarfed alongside a two-to four-inch thick volume of ‘private and local’ laws.” Id. For an argument that legislation was an important source of nineteenth century law throughout the century, at least in the states, see POPKIN, supra note 76, at
60-61.
174. For explanations of the increased legislative activity in the United States, see, e.g.,
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (1977) (“From
the 1880’s, but most markedly from the take-off decade of 1905-1915, the regulatory component
of statute law became much more prominent and added considerably to the volume of legislation, a shift of emphasis that brought a new type of statute law concerning organized relationships.”); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 63 (1977) (“The legislatures, stirred
by populist discontents, experimented with social legislation—regulating the hours and conditions of employment, restricting the exploitation of women and children, and so on.”). See generally MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC
CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933 (1990).
Civil law systems were also affected. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Sources of Law in a
Changing Legal Order, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 663, 667 (1984) (“[I]n the first part of the twentieth century, mainly in response to economic crises, a second wave of modern legislation appeared. . . . The state started to attend systematically to the elementary needs of its disadvantaged citizens, Each country laid down the main lines of its legal treatment of industrial
relations. The administrative apparatus of the modern state began to take on its present contours.”).
175. HURST, supra note 102, at 42.
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not resting on statutes are reduced almost to zero.”176 As the courts
dealt more and more with statutory issues, the conflict between courts
and the legislature over the inroads made in the common law by legislation intensified. In 1908, Roscoe Pound observed that the courts
of his era were impeding new social legislation both through narrow
constitutional interpretation and through a “narrow and illiberal attitude toward legislation conceded to be constitutional, regarding it as
out of place in the legal system, as an alien element to be held down
to the strictest limits and not to be applied beyond the requirements
of its express language.”177 As put by Calabresi: “The slow, unsystematic, and organic quality of common law change made it clearly unsuitable to many legal demands of the welfare state. . . . [S]tarting
with the Progressive Era . . . we have become a nation governed by
written laws.”178 Eventually, as Hurst pointed out, judicial doctrine
and techniques for dealing with legislation changed, to “show a markedly different temper” from nineteenth century approaches. Among
the changes was the courts’ willingness to consider legislative history
in the process of statutory interpretation.179
V. THE ROLE OF PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION
OF CONGRESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS
Changes in the Supreme Court’s attitude toward the usefulness
of congressional committee reports after Holy Trinity, the courts’ increasing general openness to new sources of authority, and the growing amounts both of legislation being enacted by Congress and litiga176. Frankfurter, supra note 23, at 527. The workloads of courts in other jurisdictions also
changed. See Jackson, supra note 4, 34 A.B.A.J. at 538; 8 F.R.D. at 122, quoting Lord MacMillan: “There will soon be little left of the common law either in England or in Scotland . . .. The
work of our courts is more and more concerned with the interpretation of almost unintelligible
legislation.”
177. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1908). See
also Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 408
(1989) (“courts often treated regulatory statutes as foreign substances.”) “Especially in older
decisions one senses that sometimes judges, conscious and proud of their leading role in the
nineteenth century as makers of common law on a grand scale, invoked such rules of construction because they regarded the growth of statute law as an intrusion on their importance and
their superior professional skill in building policy.” HURST, supra note 102, at 64 (footnote
omitted). “Statutes were no longer part of the same fabric as the common law but were antagonistic to it. Derived from different sources, they comprised an alien body of law.” Blatt, supra
note 17, at 818 (noting increased use of maxim on statutes in derogation of the common law).
178. CALABRESI, supra note 172, at 5.
179. HURST, supra note 102, at 42. See also ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 16, at 209 (“Without
the common law to guide interpretation in such statutes, legislative history emerged as another
useful context for interpretation.”).
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tion involving its interpretation all help to explain the more frequent
citations to legislative history in appellate briefs and judicial opinions
in the first decades of the twentieth century. Yet, regardless of their
probative value for interpretation, extra-legal sources of authority
could not be cited with regularity unless the materials were known to
brief and opinion writers, and available to them.
Several observers have noted that the Supreme Court’s failure to
make significant use of legislative history in the nineteenth century
was in part a result of the fact that Congress generated little material
180
Judge Kozinski has pointed
that the Court could have consulted.
out that “One given the thankless task of interpreting most statutes
passed before the 1940s finds precious little legislative history to use
for guidance: Committee reports are cursory or nonexistent, floor
statements are unilluminating and there is hardly any indication
whether there even were hearings, much less a list of who testified or
a transcript of what they said.”181 Popkin mentions improvements in
the committee structures of Congress as a factor in the generation of
more legislative information. “[O]nce the legislature began to operate primarily through committees in the later part of the nineteenth
century, courts appropriately turned to congressional committee reports to learn about the public history of the statute.”182 By 1885,
committees played so dominant a role in the legislative process that
Woodrow Wilson could write that there was no better way to describe
“our form of government in a single phrase than by calling it government by the chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress.”183
But, even as the committee system matured and Congress began
to generate materials explaining the reasoning behind federal legislation, to be useful for statutory interpretation the materials still had to
be known and available to attorneys and judges. Until the late nineteenth century, however, congressional materials and other govern-

180. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 28, at 261 (“During most of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court resisted using legislative histories, though the relative scarcity of federal legislation
at the time offered few occasions for consulting such materials for statutory interpretation even
if otherwise available.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 66-70, 89-90.
181. Kozinski, supra note 28, at 810 (emphasis in original) (citing Civil Rights Act of 1871 as
an exception).
182. POPKIN, supra note 76, at 123. See also HURST, supra note 102, at 10. Zeppos cites the
small staffs available to Congress and fewer committees as reasons for the lack of more legislative history in the late nineteenth century. Zeppos, supra note 51, at 1105.
183. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 82 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1981) (1885).
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ment documents were not widely available to lawyers or to other researchers.
A. Nineteenth Century Printing and Distribution Systems
At the turn of the twentieth century, opinions differed regarding
the effectiveness of the government’s programs for publishing and
distributing Congressional and other government information. A
1901 bicentennial history of American law by the Yale law faculty
noted the “presence in the United States, throughout the last century
of a great and steadily accumulating store of public records, stating
the law from day to day as it was actually existing and actually enforced. . .,” and concluded that the government’s publication system
gave “the student of American political institutions, or of American
history at large, an immense advantage over those engaged in similar
researches in other lands. It is accessible to all.”184 Other students of
the first century of government printing were more critical. In 1896,
William F. Willoughby detailed the faults of the decentralized system
for distributing federal documents, which largely depended on copies
distributed through members of Congress. Willoughby found that
“millions of copies of reports, many of them of great value and unobtainable through the regular channels, had accumulated in the Capitol
building.”185 Later, the director of the New York State Library found
that “[n]o comparable mass of printing of equal importance ever has
been less available for consideration or purposes of scholarship than
the documents of our government for [its] first hundred years.”186
At least in its first years, Congress was not much concerned with
developing long-term or stable systems for the printing and distribu187
The first law calling for
tion of federal government information.
distribution of public documents was not enacted until 1813.188 Prior
to the 1813 act, Congressional reports and other materials were usually printed in small official runs with distribution limited to govern-

184. Simeon E. Baldwin, Introduction to TWO CENTURIES’ GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW
1701-1901, at 1, 7 (1901).
185. Willoughby, supra note 64, at 161.
186. James Ingersoll Wyer, Government Documents–1876-1926, 51 LIBR. J. 891, 891 (1927).
187. See LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 3 (1925)
(even after the government moved to Washington, DC in 1801, “there was a decided diversity of
opinion in Congress as to the propriety of printing public documents at all”).
188. Act of Dec. 27, 1813, 3 Stat. 140 (1814). See PETER HERNON ET AL., GPO’S
DEPOSITORY PROGRAM: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 4 (1985).
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ment agencies and officials.189 By 1813, Congress had become more
aware of “the growing importance and permanent value of its . . .
transactions,”190 and acted to provide for distribution to the states of
congressional reports and documents, as well as the previously dis191
tributed copies of laws and the journals of each house, and added
200 copies to the statutorily-defined “usual number” of copies printed
in order to include distribution to non-governmental institutions such
as universities, colleges, and historical societies in each state.192 In
1817, Congress mandated common size and other standards for pub193
lishing the reports and documents issued during each session, which
made it easier to number, organize, and bind the documents into sets
that could be preserved, and provided the basis for the Congressional
Series or Serial Set, which begins with the 15th Congress. For the pre1817 period, later observers noted that even in the capitol no complete collections were known to exist.194
The Serial Set included those few written committee reports that
were issued, as well as other congressional publications and documents originating in the executive branch. However, it did not include bills and resolutions, slip laws, bound compilations of laws, or
195
published records of Congressional debates.
The distribution system established in 1813 remained in place until a series of legislative actions in 1857-1859 expanded the range of
institutions eligible for distributed publications and gave the Secretary of the Interior responsibility for distribution of documents to the

189. Sarah Jordan Miller, The Depository Library System: A History of the Distribution of
Federal Government Publications to Libraries of the United States from the Early Years of the
Nation to 1895, at 84 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University) (available
from University Microfilms). See also Wyer, supra note 186, at 891 (“For the first thirty or forty
years most of [the government’s] printing was tossed off unbound, often without title-pages, of
varying sizes, often with no numbers, dates, designations, or descriptions.”).
190. A. W. Greely, Public Documents of the First Fourteen Congresses, 1789-1817, S. Doc.
No. 428 (56th Cong.) 6 (1900).
191. 3 Stat. at 141-142.
192. 3 Stat. at 141. Miller, supra note 189, at 209; HERNON ET AL., supra note 188, at 4.
193. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, 3 Stat. 400. See Miller, supra note 189, at 198.
194. In 1900, a compiler of early Congressional documents stated that “there exists neither a
complete collection nor detailed list of the documents of the First to the Fourteenth Congresses . . .” Greely, supra note 190, at 5. See also Miller, supra note 189, at 130 (“Near the end
of the nineteenth century, the Library [of Congress] . . .didn’t have a copy of every document
issued since the founding of the government.”).
195. Miller, supra note 189, at 246. Though produced by commercial publishers for much of
the nineteenth century, publications containing the debates were subsidized by the government
and qualified as government publications. Id. at 246-47.
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public, including libraries.196 For many libraries, systematic acquisition of congressional publications began only after the 1857-1859 enactments.197 Separately, an 1857 appropriations act provided for distribution of certain retrospective publications and compilations
including the Register of Debates, the Annals of Congress, and the
Congressional Globe to Congressionally designated libraries.198
Yet, congressional committee reports, debates, and other documents that could have been used as legislative history were not widely
199
available in libraries or other institutions. It was particularly difficult for libraries to acquire copies of older publications issued before
they became depositories, despite Interior Department programs to
distribute duplicate volumes to fill gaps in the collections of libraries
designated as depositories after 1857,200 and to assist libraries in exchanging duplicate or discarded volumes to complete their collec201
tions. Many existing nineteenth-century collections of government
publications were developed privately, often on the basis of publications originally distributed in Washington to members of Congress
and others in government office.202 Eventually, the holdings of some
of these private collections became parts of collections in research libraries. Collections of documents at the law school libraries established at universities in the latter half of the century benefitted from
gifts or from duplicate volumes and discards provided by their parent
institutions’ main collections.203
196. Wyer, supra note 186, at 891-92. The new system was established by an 1857 joint
resolution, Act of Jan. 28, 1857, 11 Stat. 253; an 1858 joint resolution, Act of Mar. 20, 1858, 11
Stat. 368; and an 1859 act, Act of Feb. 5, 1859, ch. 22, sec. 5, 11 Stat. 379, 380, which ensured that
designation of the libraries would be done by members of the House and Senate rather than the
secretary. See also Miller, supra note 189, at 392-394; HERNON ET AL., supra note 188, at 4-5.
197. Miller, supra note 189, at 424.
198. Act of Mar. 3, 1857, ch. 110, 11 Stat. 240, 241. See Miller, supra note 189, at 343.
199. Nor were they indexed well-enough to allow a researcher to determine whether or not
a relevant report or other document existed. For a description of contemporary indexes to congressional publications in the nineteenth century, see LAWRENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER & ROY B.
EASTIN, GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS AND THEIR USE 31-32 (2d rev. ed. 1969).
200. Miller, supra note 189, at 426-432.
201. Sarah Jordan Miller, Government Publications in the Private Collections of Nineteenth
Century America: A Century Long Source for Federal Document Holdings in Libraries, 13
GOV’T PUB. REV. 355, 365 (1986).
202. See id. at 357-359, 363-365.
203. Id. at 361. For a history of the development of academic law libraries in the nineteenth
century, most of which occurred in the latter part of the century, see Christine A. Brock, Law
Libraries and Law Librarians: A Revisionist History; or More than You ever Wanted to Know, 67
LAW LIBR. J. 325, 341-345 (1974). Brock found that most law library development in the 1800s
was in privately-funded bar, or “social” law libraries. Id. at 332. Her article makes no note of
law libraries collecting government publications.
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B. Late Nineteenth-Century Legislative Actions
In the 1870s, Congress responded to some criticisms of its publication practices by establishing official publication of Congressional
debates in the Congressional Record in 1873, and with the publication
of the first attempt at codifying U.S. statutory law (the Revised Stat204
utes of 1873). In 1885, the first attempt at a comprehensive listing
and index of federal government publications was published, covering
205
the years 1774-1881. Yet, throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the depository system was regularly criticized by librarians and others concerned about the shortcomings of the distribution mechanisms and the lack of indexing and bibliographic control
over government publications. Despite improvements in the programs for distributing documents through the depository system,
members of Congress and departments in the executive branch continued to distribute copies of publications unsystematically and inefficiently (at least in the eyes of the critics).206
In 1895, after years of complaint and study, and recommendations by a special joint committee on printing and distribution, Con207
gress passed the Printing Act of 1895, which was later called the
“only comprehensive, carefully studied act” ever passed on the subject of government printing.208
The 1895 Act moved the office of the superintendent of documents (and responsibility for the depository program) from the De209
partment of the Interior to the Government Printing Office and
again expanded the types of libraries that could become depositories.210 It also contained several key provisions aimed at improving
the availability and usability of Congressional and other government
publications: 1) it increased the number of titles to be received by depository libraries and included the Statutes at Large and the Congres211
sional Record as depository publications, and provided for distribution of the Congressional Record and several other titles to non204. POPKIN, supra note 76, at 123.
205. See BEN PERLEY POORE, A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF THE GOVERNMENT
PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER 5, 1774-MARCH 4, 1881 (1885). For a description of the contents and shortcomings of Poore’s Catalogue, see SCHMECKEBIER & EASTIN,
supra note 199, at 6-11.
206. See generally Willoughby, supra note 64, at 156-161.
207. Act of Jan. 12, 1895, 28 Stat. 601.
208. Wyer, supra note 186, at 893.
209. Sec. 64, 128 Stat. at 611.
210. Sec. 98, 28 Stat. at 624.
211. Sec. 73, 28 Stat. at 615, 618.
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depository libraries;212 2) it simplified the organization of materials in
the Serial Set;213 and 3) it called for the Superintendent of Documents
to begin compiling lists and indexes of both executive and congressional materials, and a comprehensive “monthly catalogue” of new
publications.214
The first issue of the Catalogue of Publications Issued by the
Government of the United States (commonly known as the Monthly
Catalog) was dated January 1895, and has continued with several
215
variations in title to the present. A separate Document Index, covering only congressional publications, began publication with the second session of the 54th Congress in 1895, and was normally issued af216
ter each session. The Document Catalog, normally published
biennially after each Congress, superseded the Monthly Catalog and
the Document Index,217 and served to continue the role played by
218
In addition, several
Poore’s Catalogue for the years 1774-1881.
publications issued in the early 1900s attempted to list and index pre1895 Congressional documents.219
In the end, although the 1895 Act did not solve all the problems
220
of the distribution system, it did improve and broaden distribution
of federal publications, and provided the basis for further expansion
212. Sec. 73, 28 Stat. at 617-618.
213. Sec. 81, 28 Stat. at 621-622.
214. Sec. 62, 28 Stat. at 610-611; sec. 69 at 612.
215. For the early history of the Monthly Catalog, see SCHMECKEBIER & EASTIN, supra note
199, at 17-20. The current title is Monthly Catalog of United States Government Publications.
216. See SCHMECKEBIER & EASTIN, supra note 199, at 20-22. The Document Index was
discontinued after the 72d Congress in 1933.
217. See SCHMECKEBIER & EASTIN, supra note 199, at 22-26. The Document Catalog
ceased publication in 1947, with the Monthly Catalog assuming its role, as well as that of the
Document Index.
218. The gap between Poore’s Catalogue and the first Document Catalog was filled in 1905
with the publication of JOHN G. AMES, COMPREHENSIVE INDEX TO THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1881-1893 (1905). An earlier (1894) version of Ames’ index
covered the years 1889-1893.
219. A. W. Greely’s Public Documents of the First Fourteen Congresses, 1789-1817 was published in 1900, see Greely, supra note 190, with a later supplement issued in 1903. In 1902, the
Superintendent of Documents published Tables of and Annotated Index to the Congressional
Series of United States Public Documents, which listed and selectively indexed congressional reports and documents from 1817-1893. In 1909, the Superintendent issued volume 1 of a Checklist of United States Public Documents, 1789-1909. (A second volume indexing the publications
was never published.)
220. For continuing criticisms of the practices of free distribution of publications through
the Congress and executive agencies, see EDITH E. CLARKE, GUIDE TO THE USE OF UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 61-62 (1919); Wyer, supra note 186, at 892-893; ANNE M.
BOYD, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 50-51 (2d rev. ed. 1941).
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of the depository program and protections for depository libraries in
later legislation in the early twentieth century.221 The improvements
fostered by the 1895 Act and later legislation, as well as by initiatives
taken by the Superintendent of Documents and the Government
Printing Office in the first part of the twentieth century, effectively
made government information more available generally and Congressional documents more readily available for use in statutory interpretation than they had been in the nineteenth century. While the quality and comprehensiveness of the new indexes could be criticized, and
the Document Catalog in particular was slow in appearing,222 the new
indexing system greatly improved the researcher’s chances for determining whether or not a committee report or other document relevant to the legislative history of a recent federal statute existed.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the century and more since enactment of the 1895 Printing
Act, the means for publication and distribution of government information in the United States have changed dramatically, initially
through greater availability of print publications through expansion of
the depository and sales programs,223 and later through commercial
publication of heavily used documents in retrospective and ongoing
224
As U.S. courts turned more and more to
microform collections.
legislative history for guidance in interpreting federal statutes, the
most-used documents became more accessible in publications aimed
at lawyers,225 and new tools for locating them were developed by law
librarians, as well as by commercial publishers.226 In the last quarter
221. HERNON ET AL., supra note 188, at 8-9; SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 187, at 32-33.
222. See SCHMECKEBIER & EASTIN, supra note 199, at 26.
223. Law libraries became eligible for depository status in 1978. Act of April 17, 1978,
Pub.L. 95-261, sec. 1, 92 Stat. 199, 199. There are presently over 1350 federal depository libraries. See http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/ (last visited June 30, 2002).
224. For contemporary as well as historical legislative history research, it is hard to over estimate the importance of the publishing programs of the Congressional Information Service
(now a part of Lexis-Nexis). Since 1970, CIS has comprehensively published Congressional
documents (reports, hearings, and prints) in microform. The accompanying indexes include
legislative history tables for each law enacted; since 1984, legislative histories have been covered
in a separate annual volume, which lists and provides abstracts for each document relevant to a
new public law. Since 1997, CIS has offered the documents and the indexes electronically.
225. Since 1941, West’s United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, offered
as a supplement to the United States Code Annotated, has included the texts of selected congressional committee reports for new enactments, greatly increasing the availability of the reports in
law offices and smaller law libraries.
226. In a presentation at the 1946 annual meeting of the American Association of Law Libraries, Elizabeth Finley, librarian at Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C. discussed the
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of the twentieth century, commercial publishers and the government
made large databases of congressional materials available through
subscription services or via the world-wide-web.227
Fifty years ago, Justice Jackson was concerned with what he saw
as the practical effects on practitioners of the court’s growing acceptance of outside sources to gain insight into legislative intent. He lamented the inability of “small town lawyers” to gain access to the
legislative documents more readily available in cities.
Today, an actual small town lawyer in Greenville, North Carolina still might not have access to a collection of legislative history
documents in her office or in the Greenville public library, but she
can obtain and examine most of them fairly easily at a local university
library documents department, through the services of one of the law
school libraries in the state, or electronically. Perhaps, as Judge Wald
claimed already in 1983, well before the Internet’s impacts on legal

“craze for legislative histories [that] started with the New Deal,” as well as growing practice
among Washington law librarians to compile legislative histories for important laws. Elizabeth
Finley, Legislative Histories, 39 LAW LIBR. J. 161, 164 (1946). In a comment following Finley’s
talk, the Librarian of the U.S. Supreme Court noted that his library had “complete histories of
all of the Revenue Acts, and a good number of other major acts passed in the last five or six
years.” Id. at 165 (remarks of Vincent E. Fiordalisi). In his 1942 legal research text, Hicks
noted the recent development of published legislative histories, such as J. S. SEIDMAN,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-1861 (1938), which provided the
text of the acts and summaries of congressional documents. HICKS, supra note 161, at 81-82.
More recent examples of published legislative histories include a number of compilations by
Bernard D. Reams and others. See, e.g., BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. & CHARLES R. HAWORTH,
comps., CONGRESS AND THE COURTS: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1787-1977 (1978-1979).
As Kenneth Starr wrote in 1987, “in the current era legislative history truly abounds, with
library specialists compiling vast tomes designed to aid lawyers and judges in divining the
meaning of statutory law.” Starr, supra note 13, at 371. The Law Librarians’ Society of Washington D.C. continues to publish a union list of compiled legislative histories held in D.C. area
libraries. See LAW LIBRARIANS SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON D.C., UNION LIST OF LEGISLATIVE
HISTORIES (7th ed. 2000). See also NANCY P. JOHNSON, SOURCES OF COMPILED LEGISLATIVE
HISTORIES: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, PERIODICAL ARTICLES, AND
BOOKS (1979).
227. See Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe: the Imperative of Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9, 29 (1994), on the effects of online legal research systems on the availability of legislative history information (“Materials that were once
held in the sub-basements of only the best law libraries are now as easily retrieved on LEXIS
and Westlaw as a Supreme Court decision.”). Even such early nineteenth century publications
as the Register of Debates, the Congressional Globe, and the Annals of Congress are now available electronically along with other nineteenth century Congressional materials through the Library of Congress’s American Memory Project. See A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates 1774-1873, at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/
amlaw/lawhome.html (last visited July 4, 2002).
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research, “[t]echnology has made an anachronism of Justice Jackson’s
lament.”228
However, one should not too quickly assume that greater availability of the documents guarantees all parties meaningful access to
229
Jackson was concerned not only with
the information they hold.
having necessary documents in hand, but with the increased demands
and costs that reliance on increasingly voluminous legislative history
places on judges and particularly on attorneys. As he told the American Law Institute in 1948: “[A] formal Act, read three times and
voted on by Congress and approved by the President is no longer a
safe basis on which a lawyer may advise a client, or a lower Court decide a case. . . . [T]he lawyer must consult all of the committee reports
on the bill, and on all its antecedents and all that its supporters and
opponents said in debate, and then predict what part of the conflicting views will likely appeal to a majority of the Court.”230 As Jackson
knew, the availability problem involves more than the difficulties involved in laying hands on documents in a library, or identifying them
in an online database. It includes the problems of effectively using
large documents that are poorly indexed internally and those of
knowing what information to look for.
William Eskridge and others have noted that, if judges find legislative history relevant, the incentives increase for all parties to do
231
As a result, “[t]he costs of
more than simply “read the statute.”
legislative history are pervasive and potentially large. . . .”232 The
costs are large because legislative history research is difficult. Adrian
Vermeule has argued that legislative history is a unique research
source, “distinctively voluminous and heterogeneous in comparison
to other interpretive sources,”233 providing examples of compiled leg234
islative histories running to nearly 11,000 pages and noting the difficulties, even for judges with large staffs of clerks and staff attorneys,

228. Wald, supra note 11, at 200.
229. See Vermeule, Legislative History, supra note 30, at 1871, n. 139 (Wald’s argument
“seems too dramatic”).
230. Jackson, supra note 4, 34 A.B.A.J. at 538, 8 F.R.D. at 125.
231. Eskridge, Jr., Supreme Court, supra note 28, at 1321. Eskridge briefly examines the
possible costs and benefits of instating an exclusionary rule in U.S. courts. Id. at 1321-1323.
232. Id. at 1321, n. 100.
233. Vermeule, Legislative History, supra note 30, at 1867. Vermeule focuses primarily on
the risks of judicial error created by the distinctive features of legislative history, but recognizes
that questions involving the risk of error and the costs imposed by the inaccessibility of legislative history materials are “intertwined in practice.” Id. at 1871.
234. Vermeule, Legislative History, supra note 30, at 1867-1868.
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involved in obtaining information relevant to points at issue.235 The
heterogeneity of the materials of legislative history research contributes to the problems of finding relevant information because the record for any statute “consist[s] of materials offered on different occasions, for different purposes, and enjoying different degrees of
authority; actors in the judicial process may often simply lack the
comprehensive background knowledge of the legislative process necessary to assess the significance and weight of the sources.”236 Is it
then surprising for critics of legislative history to view its use at times
237
as something akin to picking one’s friends out of a crowd?
Comparisons with other systems’ approaches to the uses of legislative history in statutory interpretation can be only suggestive, but
they do highlight the unusual amount of undifferentiated and dispersed material potentially available in the U.S. setting. Both in
England, where courts have historically been limited in their uses of
extrinsic sources in interpretation, and in civil law jurisdictions, where
courts are allowed to consult legislative information when it is available, the materials needed are fewer and more focused than in the
United States. Other legislatures do not have “the elaborate tradition
238
of structured committee reporting” that characterizes the U.S. Congress. In parliamentary systems, the amount of material generated by
the legislative process is smaller, the materials may be of superior
quality, and the material relevant for interpretation may be more
readily packaged for use by attorneys and judges. As a result, the
problems of availability and accessibility of the materials may be less
troubling for judges and lawyers in those countries than for their
counterparts here.
The problems of understanding and weighing the likely authority
of materials in the legislative record are unlikely to be solved with a
technological fix. Indeed, as Vermeule has pointed out “cheaper
technology makes it easier not only to research legislative history but

235. Id. at 1870. For comments on the additional costs posed when courts rely on nonlegislators’ contributions to the legislative history of a statute, see Giles, supra note 30, at 377379.
236. Vermeule, Legislative History, supra note 30, at 1873. Eskridge points out the need for
parties in litigation and for attorneys advising clients “to attain some level of competence in the
ever-expanding legislative history.” Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28, at 1321. Richard Posner has
called legislative history research a “formidable subspecialty of library science,” suggesting that
“it would not demean the law schools to offer formal instruction in a highly relevant aspect of
it.” Posner, supra note 60, at 804-805.
237. See Wald, supra note 11, at 214 (comment of Judge Harold Leventhal).
238. Tiefer, supra note 30, at 275, n. 369.
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also to generate it.”239 In the twentieth century, successful legislative
history research involved more than the establishment of more government documents depositories, and it now requires more than access to larger electronic databases of Congressional materials. Newer
information delivery systems may have made it easier to locate relevant documents, but using them effectively remains difficult and
costly because of the large number of possibly relevant documents,
because they are poorly indexed internally, and because of the difficulties of determining in advance which parts of the history may be
deemed relevant to questions of interpretation.
From this perspective, the greater availability of legislative information only increases the difficulties of retrieving information pertinent to questions of legislative history. The practical aspects of information retrieval that Justice Jackson identified in 1948 still create
meaningful problems in the twenty-first century for judges deciding
cases turning on statutory interpretation and for attorneys advising
their clients.

239. Vermeule, supra note 53, at 135. The federal government’s increased reliance on electronic sources for public information also creates barriers for some information seekers and
makes access dependent on reliable and available technologies. See Peterson et al., supra note
79, at 53.

